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Abstract—In this paper, we study the vulnerability of anti-
spoofing methods based on deep learning against adversarial
perturbations. We first show that attacking a CNN-based anti-
spoofing face authentication system turns out to be a difficult
task. When a spoofed face image is attacked in the physical
world, in fact, the attack has not only to remove the rebroadcast
artefacts present in the image, but it has also to take into
account that the attacked image will be recaptured again and then
compensate for the distortions that will be re-introduced after
the attack by the subsequent rebroadcast process. Subsequently,
we propose a method to craft robust physical domain adversarial
images against anti-spoofing CNN-based face authentication. The
attack built in this way can successfully pass all the steps in the
authentication chain (that is, face detection, face recognition and
spoofing detection), by achieving simultaneously the following
goals: i) make the spoofing detection fail; ii) let the facial region
be detected as a face and iii) recognized as belonging to the
victim of the attack. The effectiveness of the proposed attack is
validated experimentally within a realistic setting, by considering
the REPLAY-MOBILE database, and by feeding the adversarial
images to a real face authentication system capturing the input
images through a mobile phone camera.
Index Terms—adversarial examples, anti-spoofing, physical
domain adversarial examples, presentation attack, face authen-
tication.
I. INTRODUCTION
SPOOFING attacks have become a serious security threatfor authentication systems, due to the facility with which
they can be used to get unauthorized access to a system
by impersonating an authorized user. In particular, spoofing
attacks against face authentication systems can be easily
launched by printing a photo of an authorized person on a
paper or by displaying it on a digital screen [1], [2]. As a
countermeasure, several anti-spoofing techniques have been
developed. Anti-spoofing systems based on deep learning have
recently demonstrated their superiority with respect to former
methods, and for this reason, they are completely replacing
model-based techniques and machine learning methods based
on hand-crafted features. For instance, in a competition host
by ChaLearn at CVPR, all the 13 teams entering the final
round of the competition were adopting a solution based on
CNN [3].
Despite the very good performance achieved by anti-
spoofing systems based on CNNs, likewise in other application
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domains, CNN methods suffer from the existence of so-
called adversarial attacks, a.k.a. adversarial examples, that is,
small, often imperceptible, perturbations that, when added to
the input of a deep neural network, induce a classification
error [4]. In a spoofing detection system, this means that
an adversarial spoofing face would be misclassified as a real
face. Compared to attacks carried out against CNNs in other
application scenarios, however, attacking a CNN-based anti-
spoofing system presents a number of significant differences
and additional challenges.
To start with, most works on adversarial attacks assume that
the attacker can feed the digitally crafted adversarial example
directly into the machine learning model [5]–[7]; such attacks
are usually referred to as digital domain attacks. However,
this assumption does not hold in the case of anti-spoofing,
where the system is designed to work in the physical world. To
clarify this point, let us consider a face authentication system
equipped with a spoofing detection module, as shown in the
first row of Figure 1. To access the system, a living person
must stand in front of the system, so that a camera takes a
digital picture of him/her and sends it to the spoofing detection
module, which will classify the image as taken from a real
person. The first step of an impersonation attack requires that
the attacker retrieves a digital picture of the victim, e.g. the
digital photo in the upper row of Figure 1 [2]. The attacker,
however, has no access to the internal pipeline of the system.
In fact, should the attacker have access to the digital input
of the system, the adversarial attack would not be necessary
at all, since he could attack the system by simply feeding
it with the digital image of the victim. On the contrary, to
attack the face anti-spoofing system, the digital image has to be
printed/displayed in the physical world and then captured by
the system camera, as illustrated in the central part of Figure 1.
This digital-to-analog, then analog-to-digital process is usually
referred to as image or video rebroadcast [8]. It is thanks to the
image modifications introduced during the rebroadcast process
that the anti-spoofing detector can understand that the digital
image fed into the system is the result of a spoofing attack and
consequently deny the access to the system. This unavoidable
spoofing procedure marks an important difference with respect
to other adversarial attacks carried out in the physical domain
(usually referred to as physical domain attacks [9], [10]),
because the spoofing detection module looks exactly for the
spoofing artefacts introduced during the rebroadcast process,
and such artefacts are unavoidably introduced again when a
physical-world version of the attacked image is fed into the
system, possibly leading to a correct detection of the spoofing
attack (see bottom part of Figure 1). For this reason, the
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2adversarial attacks must act in a pre-emptive way, anticipating
that a new spoofing pattern will be introduced again after the
atatck.
For the above reasons, creating an adversarial example
capable to attack an anti-spoofing system is not easy. The
first problem the attacker is faced with, is the choice of the
digital image to be used to create the adversarial example.
By referring to Figure 1, the adversarial example can not
be created by starting from the original image I0 available
to the attacker. Such an image, in fact, would already be
judged positively by the anti-spoofing detector, since it has
ben obtained by taking a picture of the victim of the attack.
In addition, such an image does not contain any traces of
the rebroadcast process, so it is of no help for the attacker
to build an attack that will work once the attacked image is
rebroadcast into the system. A better choice would be to apply
the attack to the image Is, obtained by feeding a rebroadcast
version of I0 into the system. For this to be possible, however,
the attacker should have access to the output of the system
camera, and we already argued that is not the case. The
solution we consider here, is that the attacker mimic the
rebroadcast/recapture process of the anti-spoofing system by
building a copy of the target system, say a smart phone, and
use it to take a photo in the desired setting. In the following
we will refer to such an image as Iˆs.
Having defined the starting point of the attack, the physical
domain adversarial examples must be built in such a way to
satisfy the following goals: i) the spoofing artefacts contained
in Iˆs during the rebroadcast process must be removed (to
the eyes of the spoofing detection model), ii) Iˆs must be
modified in such a way to preemptively take into account
that the attacked image will be rebroadcast and recaptured
again, iii) the adversarial perturbation must be robust to
the geometric and luminance distortions introduced by the
rebroadcast procedure.
Eventually, successfully attacking a face authentication sys-
tem with anti-spoofing capabilities requires not only that the
anti-spoofing module is fooled, but also that the face region is
correctly detected by the system and recognized as belonging
to the victim of the attack.
In light of the previous discussion, the contribution of this
paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We show that the straightforward application of off-
the-shelf adversarial attacks against a CNN-based anti-
spoofing face authentication system does not work.
2) Inspired by the work in [9], we design a new physical
domain attack against a face authentication system.
The adversarial spoofing images are crafted in order
to achieve the following goals: i) make the spoofing
detection fail; ii) the system detects and recognizes the
perturbed facial region as a face; iii) the attacked face
is recognized by the system as belonging to the victim
of the attack.
3) We experimentally prove the effectiveness of the attack
by using it in a realistic, physical world, setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review prior art on CNN-based anti-spoofing and existing
Fig. 1: Adversarial image generation process against an
anti-spoofing system. The process suffers from a double-
rebroadcast procedure. To be effective, the adversarial example
should fool the system after the second rebroadcast (that is,
after the re-capturing of the attacked spoofing image, that can
either be printed on a paper or displayed on a screen).
attacks against CNNs. In Section III, we describe the end-
to-end system targeted in our study, and in Section IV, we
present the proposed attack. In Section V, we introduce the
methodology we followed in our experiments and the exper-
imental setting. The results of the experiments are provided
and discussed in Section VI. Finally, we draw our conclusions
in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. CNN-based anti-spoofing
Motivated by the outstanding performance of deep neural
networks (DNNs) on computer vision and pattern recognition
tasks, researchers have started exploring the use of DNN
methods for spoofing detection. Yang at al. [11] first attempted
to exploit convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for face
spoofing detection; the authors propose to extract self-learned
features by using a CNN, and then feed them into an SVM
classifier. After that work, several different methods resorting
to CNNs for both feature extraction and classification have
been proposed: Lucena et al. [12] applied a pre-trained deep
VGG net fine-tuned on a spoofing dataset; Li at el. [13], also
used a fine-tuned VGG net and PCA to reduce the feature
dimension before a final SVM classifier. In [14], the authors
proposed a two-stream CNN that utilizes both local features
and holistic depth maps from face images. 3D CNNs have
also been proposed to extract spatial and temporal information
simultaneously [15], [16].
3In general, compared to methods based on hand-crafted
features, CNNs can learn more discriminative features, and
achieve better performance, at least when they are tested under
conditions similar to those used during training. The use of
increasingly rich databases [3] permits to mitigate the database
mismatch problem and improve the generalization capabilities
of these solutions. For all these reasons, CNN based methods
are leading the trend in anti-spoofing researches.
B. Adversarial Attacks to CNNs
Szegedy et al. [5] first demonstrated the existence of
adversarial examples for deep learning models, i.e., small
(often quasi-imperceptible) perturbations that, when added
to the input image, yield an incorrect classification. Such
vulnerability is a serious weakness of deep learning models,
especially when they are employed in security-related appli-
cations. For this reason, the analysis of the robustness of
CNN models against adversarial attacks is gaining more and
more attention [4]. Following this trend, a number of methods
have been proposed to build adversarial examples capable to
deceive deep neural networks, including the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [6], the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [17],
the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [7] and many
others [4]. Specific toolboxes have also been developed, like
Foolbox [18] and Cleverhans [19], which contain the above as
well as other state-of-the-art attacks.
Most of the attacks proposed in the literature, and among
them all the attacks mentioned above, share the assumption
that the attacker can feed the perturbed digital image directly
into the neural network. This kind of attacks are usually re-
ferred to as digital domain attacks. In a more realistic scenario,
the attackers do not have the possibility to directly feed a
digital image into the system; in these cases, the adversarial
examples are always captured by cameras or sensors. For ex-
ample, machine learning systems used for robots vision, video
surveillance and face authentication usually get their inputs
from video cameras and other sensors. Recently, researchers
have investigated the possibility to build adversarial attacks
that can work in this more realistic setting. For instance,
in [17] it is shown that adversarial examples can still fool
an image classifier after that they are printed and recaptured,
assuming that they are presented to the system in an axis-
aligned position. At the same time, it has been proven that
variations of the viewing distance and angle, quite common in
practice, have a non-negligible impact on the performance of
attacks carried out in the physical world [20], [21].
Only a few works have proposed successful attacks in
the physical domain, usually referred to as physical domain
attacks. Sharif et al. [22] attacked a face recognition system by
printing the adversarial examples on a pair of eyeglass frames.
Wearing such glasses would enable an attacker to impersonate
a different individual. In particular, the authors look for an
adversarial perturbation that can fool the face recognition
system for an entire class of images. Such a goal is achieved
by optimizing the cross-entropy loss over a set of portrait
photos collected by the attacker, which have undergone a set
of geometric transformations typical of the recapture process.
This work has shown for the first time that adversarial attacks
can be successfully carried out in the real world, even in the
presence of geometric distortions and axes misalignment. In
another work [9], the loss function is optimized over several
synthetic transformations, that is, by considering the expecta-
tion over those transformations. In this way, the authors were
able to craft 3D-printed adversarial examples that are robust
to perturbations of the viewing distance and angle. Eykholt et
al. [10] proposed a robust physical domain attack to generate
adversarial examples that can fool stop sign classifiers. Unlike
[9], they applied both synthetic and physical transformations.
Later on, such a work has been extended to attack a general
object recognition system [23].
All these works share the idea of modelling the possible
physical world distortions that the image may be subject to
during the optimization procedure, and optimize the average
loss over all the distorted images. This approach is also
adopted in this paper. Our study, however, deviates signif-
icantly from previous works, since part of the distortions
introduced during the acquisition process are the traces that
the anti-spoofing detection system relies on. So, even if one
could create an adversarial perturbation erasing the spoofing
patterns present in the image, new patterns would unavoidably
be introduced again during the physical domain attack and
possibly be detected by the detector. This makes the creation of
physical adversarial examples against anti-spoofing networks
harder to achieve.
III. TO-BE-ATTACKED FACE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
In this section, we describe the end-to-end face authentica-
tion system which we are going to attack in our study.
A. Overall structure
As shown in Figure 2, the end-to-end face authentication
system targeted by our attack consists of a cascade of clas-
sifiers whose tasks are: face detection, face recognition and
spoofing detection. We observe that the spoofing detection
module is the last step of the authentication chain. In this
way, the spoofing detection decision is made by analyzing
only the facial part of the image. This choice makes attacking
the anti-spoofing system harder, since it forces the adversarial
perturbation to be restricted to the facial region of the image,
with the consequent risk of inducing failure in the face
recognition part of the authentication chain.
Fig. 2: Structure of the end-to-end face authentication system
considered in this paper.
41) Face detection and face recognition networks: In order
to implement the face detection and recognition modules, we
used the open-source python library face recognition [24] .
This library is built on top of the open-source library dlib [25],
which provides the CNN model for face detection. The model
was trained and tested on the Labeled Faces in the Wild
benchmark [26], and it has a detection accuracy of 99.38%
in the absence of attacks.
For the face recognition module, dlib provides another
model that extracts and encodes the features from the faces
detected by the face detector network. Following the examples
provided by the face recognition library, we extracted and
encoded the features from the enroll-set of REPLAY-MOBILE
database [27], the features are further used to train a k-nearest-
neighbors (KNN) classifier. The face recognition module was
evaluated on the test set and reached 100% accuracy. We refer
to [24], [25] for more information about the CNN structure and
other details.
2) Spoofing Detection network: To build the spoofing de-
tection module, we fine-tuned a network pre-trained on the
spoofing detection data set [12]. Specifically, we took a VGG-
16 network pre-trained on ImageNet database [28]. The archi-
tecture of the network is shown in Figure 3. The fine-tuned
layers are highlighted in yellow in the figure, while the weights
of the other layers remained fixed. To fine-tune the network,
so to make it work in the setting used for our experiments,
we collected our own data set from the same laboratory
environment that we used, later on, to carry out the attack
experiments. We first took a subset of real-access videos in the
REPLAY-MOBILE database [27]. Then, we rebroadcasted and
recaptured the videos to collect the spoofing class of images.
Rebroadcasting was carried out by displaying the original
videos on a digital screen, in the mean time a cell phone, fixed
on a tripod, was taking pictures of the screen continuously.
During the rebroadcasting process, we slowly moved the cell
phone to cover different shooting angles and distances. In
this way, we obtained about 30,000 spoofing images. At the
same time, we took 13,000 frames from the original videos to
build the dataset with the original, non-spoofed, images. In the
end, the facial part of all the collected images were cropped,
and divided into training, testing and validation parts, each
containing different identities. The laboratory setting we used
to build the dataset (and then carry out the attack experiments)
is depicted in Figure 6. For the training process, we used the
Adam optimizer with learning rate equal to 10−4. After 50
epochs, the fine-tuned model achieved 98.39%, 94.56% and
93.17% accuracies on the training, validation and test sets
respectively. The details of the performance on each part of
the data set are shown in Figure 4.
IV. PROPOSED ATTACK
Our goal is to build a physical adversarial attack against the
end-to-end system depicted in Figure 2, that is, to produce ad-
versarial spoofing images capable to: i) pass the face detection
step, ii) be recognized as the individual targeted by the attack,
and iii) fool the final spoofing detection check, thus illegally
gaining access to the system. Below, we first formulate the
Fig. 3: Architecture of the spoofing detection CNN. Yellow
blocks denote the fine-tuned layers while the weights of the
other layers remained fixed.
Fig. 4: Evaluation result of our spoofing detection model on
each part of the data set
standard problem of generating a digital domain adversarial
image, then we refine the formulation to fit the case of physical
domain attacks.
Let I denote an input image and ltrue the corresponding
label and let ltarget 6= ltrue be the target label of the attack. Let
f(·) denote the soft output of the neural network under attack.
In general, finding an adversarial perturbation ρ corresponds
to solving the following optimization problem:
argmin
ρ
J (f(I + ρ), ltarget),
subject to ‖ρ‖p < 
(1)
where J (·) denotes the loss function of the neural network,
and ‖ · ‖p denotes the Lp-norm, the most common choice
corresponding to p = 2. Usually, the above optimization is
approximately solved by using the corresponding Lagrangian-
relaxed form:
argmin
ρ
J (f(I + ρ), ltarget) + λ‖ρ‖p (2)
where λ is a hyper-parameter controlling the strength of the
distance penalty term ‖ρ‖p.
In the case of spoofing detection, which is a binary clas-
sification problem, the goal of the attacker is to induce the
CNN to classify a spoofing image as real. By adopting the
formalism introduced in Section I and depicted in Figure 1, in
the sequel we use Iˆs instead of I to denote the spoofing image
under attack, therefore the target class ltarget is always “real”,
with reference to the output of the spoof detection network.
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, we use the label “0”
for “real” and “1” for “spoofing” images.
5In a physical domain setting (see Figure 1), the spoofing
detection network is not fed directly with Iadv = Iˆs + ρ∗ (ρ∗
being the optimum perturbation obtained by solving (2)), but
with its recaptured version Ir = r(Iadv) = r(Iˆs + ρ∗), where
we use r(·) to denote the rebroadcast and recapture procedure.
For this reason, there is no guarantee that the perturbation
ρ∗ will induce a detection error. In fact, we will show in
Section VI, that the spoofing detection network identifies Ir
as a spoofed image with high probability.
In general, to obtain a robust perturbation that still works
when the image is degraded due to rebroadcast, we need
to model the perturbations the image is subject to during
the rebroadcast process, and take such a model into account
within the optimization problem in (1) (or (2)). Formally, by
denoting withR the set of distortions the attack must be robust
to, the perturbation ρ is found by optimizing the average loss
over R, that is,
argmin
ρ
Er∼R[J (f(r(I + ρ)), lt)] + λ‖ρ‖p. (3)
The above formulation has been first introduced in [9], in the
attempt to get an adversarial perturbation robust to geometric
image transformations, such as angle and viewpoint perturba-
tions and is referred to as Expectation over Transformation
(EOT). The effectiveness of such an approach has been vali-
dated in [9] in an object recognition context. By following the
EOT approach, a robust adversarial physical domain attack
capable to fool the end-to-end face authentication system in
Figure 2 can be obtained by solving the following optimiza-
tion:
min
ρ
Er∼R[J (fs(r(Iˆs + ρ)), lt)] + λ‖ρ‖p
s.t. φ(fd(r(Iˆs + ρ))) = 1, φ(fr(r(Iˆs + ρ))) = pIˆs ,
(4)
where φ() is the argmax function used to obtain the predicted
label from the soft output, fs denotes the soft output of the
spoofing detection network, J is its loss function and fd,
fr denote the decision functions of the face detection and
face recognition networks respectively. For the face detector
φ(fd(·)) = 1 stands for “face” (and 0 for “non face”). For
the face recognition network φ(fr(·)) = pIˆs denotes the
correct identity for the image Iˆs. The attack is successful when
φ(fs(r(Iˆs + ρ
∗))) = 0 subject to the two constraints.
We now investigate what happens when the adversarial
example is used against a spoofing detection system. A
well-trained spoofing detection network should be able to
distinguish an original image Io and its rebroadcast version
Iˆs = r(Io), for any r ∈ R (the set R is usually defined by the
way the training set is built). For a valid physical adversarial
perturbation, we should have φ(fs(r′(r(Io) + ρ))) = 0 for
r′, r ∈ R. This is a hard goal to achieve, since the network
fs() has just been trained to provide a large response on
any r′′(·) ∈ R. Given the above observation, we need to
characterize R in the anti-spoofing setting targeted in this
paper, in order to build an attack which is at the same time
robust to geometric perturbations and robust to the degradation
caused by the rebroadcast procedure.
A. Rebroadcast modeling
As indicated in previous works [9], [10], [29], the degrada-
tion introduced by rebroadcasting is due to two main factors:
geometric distortions, including rotation, view distance and
angle changes, and displaying or printing artefacts, like color
distortion and light reflection. In our work, we decided to
model the geometric distortion by simple transformations like
rescaling, translation, and perspective transforms, and the dis-
play artefacts by means of hue, saturation, contrast and bright-
ness changes. A complete description of all the transformations
that we used to model the rebroadcast artefacts is given in
Table I, where the range of the parameters characterizing
each transformation is also reported. The transformations were
implemented by using the open-source python library imgaug,
version 0.2.8 [30], to which we refer for a more detailed
explanation of the transformation parameters.
For EOT, every r() in (3) (and (4)) is a composite transfor-
mation consisting of all the transformations in Table I applied
in random order. Every single transformation is applied with
the parameters randomly selected in the allowed range. The
average loss is then computed over 2000 versions of the to-
be-attacked image obtained by applying to it the composite
transformations.
TABLE I: Distortions used to model the rebroadcast process.
Trasformation Range
Affine
Rotation [−5◦, 5◦]
Shear [−5◦, 5◦]
Scaling [0.85, 1.15]
Translation [0, 15%]of image size
Perspective [0, 0.025]
Brightness [0.85, 1.15]
Constrast [0.9, 1.1]
Gaussian Blurring(stdev) [0, 1]
Hue and Saturation (value added to H
and S Channel)
[−15, 15]
B. Solving the attack optimization problem
Previous works have shown that the optimization problem
in (3) can be solved by well-know gradient descent algorithms
like Adam [31] or projected gradient descent. In our case,
an additional difficulty could be represented by the presence
of the two additional constraints in (4), however we found
that solving (3) with an additional condition on the Peak
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is enough. The reason for
such an observation is the following. Even if adversarial
examples maintain part of their effectiveness against models
other than that targeted by the attack, this property (often
referred to as attack transferability) does not generally hold
when adversarial examples are transferred between models
with different tasks [32]. Therefore our attack against the
spoofing detection model is likely to have a limited effect on
the face detection and recognition networks. Yet, we still need
to limit the distortion introduced by the attack to avoid that the
attacked image is so degraded to impede a correct operation
of the face detection and image recognition modules. For this
reason, we set a PSNR stop condition to avoid such an extreme
case. In fact, we verified experimentally that lower-bounding
6the PSNR to 20dB, the attacked images pass the face detection
and recognition steps (see Section VI).
As we said, to test the effectiveness of our attack in a
general and practical way, we considered a face authentication
system that takes as input pictures containing both face and
background, while the spoofing detection module considers
only the small region containing the facial part only (as
detected by the face detection module). Yet, in the previous
sections, the adversarial attacks (be them performed in the
physical or digital domain) are applied only to the facial region
of the image. Then, to test the adversarially perturbed face
against the entire authentication system, the attacked facial
region is embedded into an overall picture containing the face,
part of the body, and the background. The resulting image
is simply denoted as attacked image, and is used to launch
the spoofing attack against the end-to-end system. Figure 5
shows an example of adversarial examples against the spoofing
detection network and the correspond attacked image.
(a) Digital domain test pipline
(b) Physical domain test pipline
Fig. 5: Experimental pipelines to evaluate the performance of
attacks.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
A. Experimental setting
For our experiments, we used the same laboratory setting
used for the dataset collection described in Section III-A2
(see Figure 6). We used an Acer KA240HQ digital screen
(23.6 inches, 1920 ×1080 resolution) as the monitor to display
the spoofed images, and a Sumsung Note9 cell phone as
the acquisition camera (12.0 MP resolution). The shooting
angle and distance in all the experiments and during dataset
collection (Section III) range from -20◦ to 20◦, and from 10cm
to 50 cm, respectively.
To show that the direct rebroadcast of an image attacked
in the digital domain is not enough to fool the spoofing
detection system, we used several digital attacks included
in the foolbox [18] library (version 1.8.0), that is, the Fast
Fig. 6: Laboratory setting used to build fine-tuning data set
and perform attack experiments.
Gradient Sign Method (FGMS) introduced in [6], the Basic
Iterative Method (BIM) in [17], the Gradient Attack (GA),
Iterative Gradient Attack (IGA), and the Iterative Gradient
Sign Attack (IGSA). The GA is a one-shot implementation
of the standard gradient attack. The IGA and IGSA are the
iterative versions of GA and FGSA, respectively, which, even
if more time consuming, are more effective than the single-
step attack methods. For each attack, we generated two sets of
adversarial examples using different parameters, introducing
perturbation with different strengths. For reproducibility, we
list the parameters of the attacks and the average PSNR of the
adversarial examples in Table II1.
With regard to the proposed physical domain attacks, we
also considered two sets of adversarial examples. The first
set was obtained by setting λ = 0 in (4), that is without
considering the distance penalty in the loss function (Set#1,
average PSNR=21.97). In this case, the effectiveness of the
attack is maximized, at the price of a stronger distortion. To
build the second set, we set the penalty term to λ = 0.1 (Set#2,
average PSNR=24.73) so to penalize larger distortions.
To mimic the acquisition part of the attacked system and
forge the to-be-attacked images Iˆs, we used another Sumsung
Note9 with the same characteristics of the one used in the
face authentication system. In total, we forged 160 spoofing
images, corresponding to 9 different identities. We verified
that all of the them are correctly classified as spoofing images
when they are rebroadcast and used as input of the spoofing
detection network. These 160 images were used to generate all
the adversarial examples used in our experiments, including
5 digital domain attacks and the proposed physical domain
attack.
1For each attack, foolbox provides many parameters that help the user
to control the strength of the attack. Giving and explanation of all such
parameters would require too much space thus, for simplicity, we only give
the values of the parameters and refer to [18] for their meaning
7TABLE II: Parameters used for existing digital domain attacks.
Each row corresponds to one set of adversarial examples.
([0.1:1.1,1000] denotes 1000 values evenly distributed from
0.1 to 1.1, “\” denotes the parameter is not available for this
attack.
epsilon step size binarysearch PSNR
BIM 0.3 default Flase 21.250.7 0.08 False 25.46
FGSM [0.1:1.1,1000] \ \ 20.87[0.05:0.5,1000] \ \ 26.01
GA [0.1:1.1,1000] \ \ 21.93[0.05:0.5,1000] \ \ 26.73
IGSA [0.075:0.75,100] \ \ 21.90[0.05:0.5,100] \ \ 25.57
IGA [0.08,0.8,100] \ \ 21.17[0.05:0.5,100] \ \ 25.47
B. Evaluation metrics
The effectiveness of the various attacks is measured by
means of the Attack Success Rate (ASR), namely, the ratio
of the number of attacked images that fool the system to the
total number of images being attacked. We evaluated all the
attacks (including the digital domain attacks and the proposed
attack) in both the digital domain and the physical domain,
each time following the corresponding pipeline.
The performance in the digital domain are assessed with
respect to the spoofing detection network targeted by the
attack. As shown in Figure 5a, the digital adversarial examples
are directly fed into the spoofing detection model, then, the
attack is successful when the adversarial spoofing face is
detected as real, i.e., φ(fs(Iadv)) = 0.
In the physical domain, digital adversarial examples are first
embedded into the whole picture to form the attacked images.
The attacked image is displayed on the monitor, captured by
the camera and finally passed through the three modules of
the authentication system. The performance are assessed with
respect to the entire face authentication system, that is, by
measuring the ratio between the number of images detected
as real, non-spoofed, faces and recognized as belonging to
the victim of the attack, and the total number of tests. An
example of successful attack is reported in Figure 5b. For sake
of clarity, we use the symbol ASRD to denote the success rate
when the attack is carried out in the digital domain and ASRP
when the attack is carried out in the physical domain.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We first show that digital domain attacks designed without
taking into account the recapture process fail when they are
applied as they are in a physical world scenario. Then, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed physical domain
attack.
A. (In)effectiveness of digital domain attacks in a physical
domain setting
We tested the performance of the 5 existing digital attacks
described in Section V-A when they are applied in the physical
domain. The results we got are in Table III (PSNR ' 20dB)
and Table IV (PSNR ' 25dB). All the attacks have a good
performance when they are applied in the digital domain. In
particular, the iterative attacks can always reach 100% ASRD
under all PSNR conditions. GA and FGSM are suboptimum
attacks, then, not surprisingly, the ASRD is lower. In all
cases, the performance drop significantly when the attacks
are applied in the physical domain, and nearly all of them
fail with an ASRP lower than 30%. Expectedly, the stronger
attacks (PSNR ' 20dB) exhibit a higher success rate, which,
however, remains always below 50%.
TABLE III: Performance of digital attacks with PSNR limita-
tion set to 20dB.
PNSR ASRDin digital domain
ASRP
in physical domain
BIM 21.25 100% 42.24%
FGSM 20.87 85% 26.99%
GA 21.93 77.20% 35.99%
IGSA 21.90 100% 32.5%
IGA 21.17 100% 39.53%
TABLE IV: Performance of digital attacks with PSNR limita-
tion set to 25dB.
PNSR ASRDin digital domain
ASRP
in physical domain
BIM 25.46 100% 28.48%
FGSM 26.01 87.29% 8.77%
GA 26.73 86.32% 18.88%
IGSA 25.57 100% 13.75%
IGA 25.47 100% 27.38%
B. Effectiveness of the proposed attack
In this section, we assess the performance of the proposed
physical domain attack. For the sake of completeness, we first
show how the attack performs in the digital domain, then
we move to the physical domain scenario. We also assess
the performance of the proposed attack in a realistic testing
scenario, where we assume that the authentication system can
be queried multiple times from the same user before the access
to the system is blocked (as it is the case with most practical
systems). In this scenario, the attack effectiveness is expected
to improve since the attack can be performed multiple times
in the attempt to impersonate the targeted user. This behaviour
is confirmed by the results we got.
1) Effectiveness in the digital domain: By using the setting
described in Section V, we verified that all the 320 adversarial
examples of Set#1 and Set#2 fool the spoofing detection
network when they are fed to the system directly in the digital
domain, with 100% ASRD for both Set#1 and Set#2. Such
results are provided in Table V , together with the average
PSNR for the two sets.
TABLE V: Performance of the proposed attack.
Adversarial
examples
Average
PNSR
ASRD in
digital domain
ASRP
in physical domain
Set#1 21.97 100% 82.5%
Set#2 24.73 100% 75%
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(a) With misalignment
(b) Without misalignment
Fig. 8: Attacked images from Set#1: (a) attacked images
without re-alignment and (b) with realignment.
2) Effectiveness in the physical domain: When we pass
to the physical domain, as expected, the performance drop
a bit (last column in Table V). However, unlike with digital
attacks, the ASRP remains good. Not surprisingly, the best
performance in the physical setting are obtained by the images
in Set#1 with an ASRP = 82.5%. The performance remain
reasonably good (ASRP = 75%) even if we decrease the
strength of the perturbation as done in Set#2. Some examples
of attacked images from Set#1 are shown in Figure 7 and
Figure 8a.
With regard to the visual quality of the attacked images,
we notice from Fig. 8a that some adversarial images show a
slight misalignment between the face and the background. This
is because no extra alignment is applied when the attacked
face is re-introduced into the overall image. To mitigate this
phenomenon, a possibility is to post-process the images. We
did that and manually crafted 100 attacked images from Set#1.
As shown in Figure 8b, these new adversarial images look
more natural. The end-to-end tests showed that this mismatch
TABLE VI: Distribution of attack failures across the various
steps of the authentication system
face detection face recognition spoofing detection
Set#1 0% 7.14% 92.86%
Set#2 0% 5% 95%
Fig. 9: Attacked image post-processed with Photoshop.
does not affect much the final result, and 80% of the manually
aligned adversarial images successfully fool the system. This
is an important result, since one may argue that a refined
spoofing detector could take advantage of the misalignment
to detect the presence of the attack. As to the feasibility of
manual realignment, it is reasonable to argue that the attacker
can spend some time to craft better pictures, e.g. carefully
blurring and feathering the images, adjusting the edges through
blending, etc . . . . Figure 9 provides an example of a visually
pleasant attacked image achieved by adjusting its quality with
Photoshop. The image can still fool the spoofing detection
system.
It is worth to observe that the majority of rejections given by
the authentication system comes from the spoofing detection
module. Specifically, all the attacked images in Set#1 and
Set#2 pass the face detection module. Regarding the face
recognition step, only a few attacked images occasionally
failed at this level, in which case the detected face is mistak-
enly recognized as belonging to an individual other than the
target one. Table VI details the distribution of attack failures
across the various steps of the authentication system.
3) Test scenario with multiple attacks: Practical authentica-
tion systems allow several attempts from the same user before
blocking the access. In this setting, an attacker is successful
if he can pass the authentication system within the allowed
number of access attempts. To elaborate, let us assume that
the authentication system allows at most 3 access attempts,
and define a new measure, named Impersonate Success Rate
(ISR), which is the probability that the attacker succeeds to
impersonate a given user at least once. The average ISR over
all the identities gives the attack success rate in this scenario
with multiple trials.
For a given identity, suppose the attacker has Nt adversarial
examples (with the corresponding attacked images) obtained
starting from different real images. Let Nf be the number of
attack failures out of Nt(Nf ≤ Nt), i.e. ASRP =1-Nf/Nt.
9TABLE VII: ISR for the different identities in the two sets of attacked images. For each identity, the upper row denotes the
result of Set#1, and the lower row that of Set#2. Each entry is given shown in the “(Nf , Nt) = ISR” form.
Identity ISR Identity ISR Identity ISR
Client01 (0,20)=100% Client02 (9,20)=92.63% Client03 (2,20)=100%(0,20)=100% (6,20)=98.25% (4,20)=99.65%
Client04 (2,20)=100% Client05 (2,20)=100% Client06 (0,10)=100%(9,20)=92.63% (0,20)=100% (0,10)=100%
Client07 (0,20)=100% Client08 (12,20)=80.7% Client09 (1,10)=100%(10,20)=89.47% (5,20)=99.12% (6,10)=83.33%
The ISR for one identity can then expressed as:2
ISR =1− Nf
Nt
(
Nf − 1
Nt − 1
)(
Nf − 2
Nt − 2
)
= 1−
(
Nf
3
)(
Nt
3
) , (5)
where
(
n
k
)
denotes the binomial coefficient.
The ISR of each identity in the two sets of adversarial
examples is shown in Table VII. For each identity, the upper
row denotes the result of Set#1, and the lower row that
of Set#2. As one can see, a large ISR is achieved for all
identities, and the ISR reaches 100% in 7 out of 9 cases,
with the worst case being ISR = 80.7%. The average ISR
over all the identities is 97.04% and 95.82% for Set #1 and
#2, respectively.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have built a physical domain attack against
a CNN-based face authentication systems equipped with an
anti-spoofing module. We first showed that, compared to other
application scenarios where the attacks are carried out in
the physical domain, performing an attack against an anti-
spoofing face authentication systems is more difficult and
poses a number of additional challenges. By carefully crafting
the attack, and by paying particular attention to modelling
the distortions introduced by the rebroadcast process, we have
shown that such an attack is indeed possible. In particular, the
experimental results we have got confirm that, by using our
method, it is possible to successfully craft adversarial spoof
images that can at the same time pass the spoofing detection
check, the face detection check, and deceive the recognition
system (the attacked face is recognized as belonging to the
victim of the attack).
Future work may focus on extending our attack to a scenario
in which the attack is carried by showing a printed version
of the adversarial example to the authentication system. The
case of face authentication based on video data is also worth
investigation. From the defender’s side, future research has to
be performed to recover robustness against anti-spoofing, and
design new CNN-based face authentication systems capable to
work in the presence of adversarial spoofing attacks.
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